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25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [] O/DDI
25X1 FROM : [] OCI
SUBJECT : Comments on JCS Paper: "Joint Counter-Insurgency
Concept and Doctrinal Guidance," 5 April 1962

1. Since the referenced document was prepared by the military with the stated purpose of providing "doctrinal and conceptual guidance" for the US Armed Forces, it is understandable that the paper as a whole lays heavy stress on the role of the military in counterinsurgency operations and treats the roles of non-military governmental agencies in rather cursory fashion. The portion of the paper dealing with the specific responsibilities of principal participants in the counterinsurgency effort is far from exhaustive; the very brief treatment of CIA's responsibilities, for example, makes no mention of the agency's role in trying to identify potential or incipient insurgency situations although this is mentioned elsewhere in the paper almost in passing. Moreover, in describing "military counter-insurgency programs," the document enumerates certain "military civic action" projects such as health and welfare programs, and psychological warfare operations, which, unless thoroughly coordinated with the activities of other responsible US agencies, could be counter-productive. Presumably, as the counterinsurgency problem is more thoroughly studied by all governmental agencies concerned, a balanced national concept will be produced.

2. The section of the JCS paper headed "Background" is too brief and not truly "background." The two specific cases of insurgency described (Laos and South Vietnam) are cast in terms of post-mortem, lauding the roles of the US military in these operations and criticizing the lack of proper coordination of unidentified "various components" of the government. On "Future Insurgency," the broad statement is made that "similar to Laos and South Vietnam/insurgencies are incipient elsewhere in Southeast Asia, in Latin America, in Africa, and in the Middle East," and that these will be supported by the USSR. While it is likely that potential insurgency exists in the areas cited, it is quite unlikely that insurgency in Colombia, for example, would bear much resemblance to that in Laos or South Vietnam or that Soviet support for a Colombian outbreak would take the form of an airlift. Yet the paper seems to assume that all insurgency situations will follow the same pattern and therefore can be countered in the same way.

3. This raises a fundamental question of definition which the document itself does not clarify. In referring to insurgency in the first few pages, the document does not specify the instigator or sponsor of insurgency. Under title of "The Threat," however, only Communism is treated as the in-

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instigator or supporter of insurgency. But in the glossary, insurgency is defined as "subversive political activity, civil rebellion, revolt, or insurrection designed to weaken and/or overthrow a duly constituted government or occupying power." No instigator or sponsor is mentioned. The definition of counterinsurgency similarly does not mention Communism as the force to be countered. It is entirely possible that insurgency (as defined in the document's glossary) could arise without Communist instigation and that the objectives of the insurgents might be quite different from Communist objectives in the country concerned. The JCS doctrine appears to apply exclusively to Communist-inspired and -supported insurgencies and does not take into account other possibilities which would fall under the glossary's definition of insurgency.

4. The JCS paper in toto conveys the impression that CIA and other civilian agencies deserve only minor roles in counterinsurgency operational planning and although the paper acknowledges certain non-military aspects of counterinsurgency, it leaves the reader with the feeling that counterinsurgency is essentially and in all cases a military affair. Some of the more subtle forms of insurgency (by Communists) are enumerated in the section, "The Threat," followed by the statement "...active guerrilla warfare is only one aspect of insurgency, albeit a most important one which demands particular attention by the military." This is followed by a detailed account of "time-tested" guerrilla tactics. In several places scattered throughout the paper the point is made, however, that success in counterinsurgency operations cannot be accomplished by the military alone but is dependent on the integrated efforts of all government agencies concerned.

5. Two sentences in the paper--several pages apart--seem to be worth highlighting. One says, "The essential element of political stability is a government which responds to the needs of the people." The other, "the creation of a condition of political stability and the creation of a government which can gain and retain the support of the people is a prime objective of US counterinsurgency efforts." The organization of the JCS paper could perhaps be improved if the idea embodied in those sentences were presented at the beginning, followed by a description of a national concept for attaining the stated objective. Finally the military role in attaining the objective as a member of the US team could present specific doctrinal and tactical guidance for the military in carrying out its mission toward achieving the prime objectives.

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